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Modeling Mass Support for 
German Chancellors and their Parties: 
some Problems and some Results 
Christopher Anderson* 
Abstract: This paper examines the link between chancellor 
approval and chancellor party support in Germany from 
1950-1990 in the context of economic popularity functions. 
It demonstrates some of the modeling and estimation pro-
blems that can occur in simultaneous equation systems and 
it suggests an alternative to the standard single equation 
approach commonly used in models of government popu-
larity. Substantively, the results confirm that the state of the 
economy drives government support Moreover, chancellor 
approval is shown to be an important predictor of support 
for the chancellor's party and vice versa. 
Models of economic conditions and government popularity typically seek to 
explain either (1) the dynamics of sup;port for governing parties or (2) the ups 
and downs in public approval of the executive office holder's performance. 
However, while it is well established that macro-economic conditions drive (at 
least to some extent) public support for governments,1 relatively little is known 
about the link between the support for an individual executive and support for 
his/her political party. In fact, very few scholars have chosen to examine the 
relationship between party and executive support in the context of economic 
popularity functions (cf. Marsh and Harrison 1993). 
* Address all communications to Christopher Anderson, Department of Political Scien-
ce, Rice University, P.O.Box 1892, Houston, TX 77251, USA. Bitnet: CJA@RI-
CEVM1.RICE.EDU. 
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Executives are normally the most visible and widely known proponents of 
their parties. Popular executives can thus, for example, help their parties gain 
support with the mass electorate; similarly; representing an unpopular party or 
a party that is in decline for socio-structural reasons may, for example, make it 
more difficult for a Prime Minister to generate public support for his/her per-
formance. Even though the Prime Minister or chancellor is the main and most 
visible proponent of his/her party, there have been few systematic attempts to 
explore the consequences of this interrelationship for the study of government 
popularity. 
Typically, economic variables have been used to explain fluctuations in go-
vernment support while political variables have less frequently been part of 
popularity models. This paper argues, first, that we need to understand both the 
economic and the political determinants of mass support for governments and 
that, second, one of the main reasons for the relative neglect of political variab-
les lies in the difficulties associated with modeling the phenomenon. In the case 
of executive approval and party support, the difficulty lies in modeling a si-
multaneous relationship. While the modeling obstacles are significant and need 
to be carefully considered, there are ways to develop more fully specified 
models of government popularity which incorporate information about the cru-
cial relationship between a politician's approval and his/her party's support 
together with exogenous information about the state of the economy. 
Classic Assumptions and Findings 
The classic hypothesis that has been employed to relate citizens' behavior/at-
titudes to economic performance is the reward-punishment hypothesis. Accor-
ding to this hypothesis, one would expect inferior economic performance to 
lead to loss of support for the incumbent government. The relationship between 
economic indicators (e.g., unemployment and inflation) and support for the 
government is thus expected to be negative. Variants of this hypothesis have 
been tested most extensively in the literature on government popularity func-
tions and economic voting, where they have been found to be of considerable 
explanatory value.2 
In a review of the literature on economic voting, Lewis-Beck finds a general 
consensus among scholars that »when economic conditions are bad, citizens 
vote against the ruling party« (1991:2). However, the evidence for aggregate 
level economic effects on government popularity or vote choice is not always 
conclusive or straightforward, as Paldam points out (1991). Why is the rela-
tionship between economic conditions and government popularity conditional? 
2 Other hypotheses that have been tested include the issue-priority and the stability 
hypotheses (cf. Hibbs 1977,1987; Budge and Farlie 1983; Clarke et al. 1992; Paldam 
and Schneider 1980). 
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Different researchers analyzing slightly different time periods, different indi-
cators of economic performance, different measures of these indicators, using 
different estimation methods, or examining different countries to test their hy-
potheses, have frequently disagreed about the magnitude of the economic ef-
fects and even about whether the economy is an important predictor of govern-
ment support at all (see e.g. Nannestad and Paldam, 1993; and Lewis-Beck 
1991 for good overviews). Research on the effects of economic conditions on 
public opinion has for a long time focused on the inconsistent estimates obtai-
ned for the economic coefficients. As a consequence, it has often been assumed 
that the economy-mass opinion relationship has been modeled or estimated 
imperfectly because the economic side of the relationship was not properly 
understood. This has led to an emphasis on economic effects and a relative 
neglect of the political side of government popularity functions. 
Modeling Government Support 
As the above discussion indicates, the economic part of the popularity models 
has traditionally been much better explored than the political components (Pal-
dam 1991; Nannestad and Paldam 1993; Lewis-Beck and Mitchell 1993). In 
fact, models that sought to demonstrate significant effects of economic condi-
tions on popular support for the government were frequently biased toward 
finding such effects by including several economic variables, but severely mis-
specifying the political variables. Typically, these models have included eco-
nomic and political variables in an additive formulation, where great care was 
taken to model the economic effects while political variables took the form of 
controls to be included in order to show significant economic effects. The 
models that I test here seek to redress part of this imbalance with formulations 
which allow the drawing of inferences about economic effects without neglec-
ting the political factors that play important roles for the dynamics of govern-
ment support in one European democracy, the Federal Republic of Germany. 
Typically, models of government popularity have taken the form of single 
equation models that included party/executive support as the dependent variab-
le and a number of economic and political variables as the independent variab-
les in an additive formulation. A typical example for such a strategy is the 
following model estimated by Kirchgäßner (1986) who estimates support for 
the SPD and the CDU in Germany between 1971 and 1982 with the help of 
monthly support data. In this case, Kirchgäßner explains fluctuations in gover-
ning party support with the help of changing economic conditions, expressed in 
levels of inflation and unemployment: 
6 
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where CDU and SPD is the support for the CDU and SPD, U is the seasonally 
adjusted unemployment rate, and I is the rate of inflation. Note that the incum-
bent party during this period (SPD) loses support with increases in unemploy-
ment and inflation while the opposition party (CDU) gains in support under the 
same circumstances. 
Another strategy that is frequently employed in studies of the American and 
French cases involves explaining changes in presidential popularity with the 
help of similar economic variables. The model used by Lafay (1985) to esti-
mate the effects of economic conditions on the popularity of the French Pre-
sident from 1974 to 1983 is a good example for such a strategy: 
where Pt is the percentage of respondents satisfied with the president of the 
Republic, I t_1 / 6 is the inflation rate on six months (lagged by one month), an-
nualized, U is the unemployment rate, G t_ 1 / 1 5 is the real disposable income 
growth on fifteen months (lagged by one month), annualized, E is the exchange 
rate of francs per dollar, and DB and DL are dummy variables for the Plan 
Barre and a leftist administration. In this case, the Lafay showed that rising 
unemployment and inflation rates and a weakening of the franc leads to loss of 
support for the French president, while growth in disposable income results in 
increased mass support for the executive. 
Political parties play important roles in parliamentary democracies, and the 
executive's standing with the mass publics is crucial for our understanding of 
democratic politics. In fact, experts of German politics have, e.g., frequently 
referred to the German political process as »chancellor-democracy« and have 
consistently pointed to an advantage enjoyed by the chancellor's party on elec-
tion day as a »chancellor bonus.« What are the implications of the relationship 
between executive and party support? Fortunately, it is possible to examine 
both the support for the governing party as well as the executive's policies with 
the help of systematically collected public opinion data. 
The Problem of Modeling Chancellor and Party Support 
The analyses performed below are based on aggregate monthly polling results 
for the chancellor's' party and the chancellor himself for the period between 
1950 and 1990. The data were originally collected by the Institut fur Demos-
kopie, Allensbach, integrated into a data set by the Zentralarchiv fur Empiri-
sche Sozialforschung (ZA), and updated for this analysis. All monthly surveys 
are based on random national samples of about 1,000 to 1,500 respondents 
each. There is no reason to assume that the samples are biased in any syste-
matic fashion. The question wording for party support is »If there were a 
7 
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Bundestag election next Sunday, which party would you vote for?«, while 
approval for the chancellor's handling of his job is gauged by »Do you — by 
and large — agree with the policies of chancellor XY?«. 3 
Figures 1 and 2 plot the two series. Note that the question formats of the 
party and chancellor support questions force respondents to choose between 
different parties while voters of different parties can all express support for the 
way the chancellor is handling his job. 
The plots reveal that there appear to be distinct phases of chancellor and 
party support over time. Immediately after the war, few citizens apparently 
approved of Adenauer's (1949-1963) handling of the chancellorship. There 
also seems to have been a systematic decline in the public's support for any 
chancellor's policies. Starting with the high of support for chancellor Kiesinger 
(1966-1969) — according to this measure the most popular German chancellor 
since the founding of the Federal Republic — chancellors have lost support the 
longer they have been in office. The most striking examples of this trend are 
chancellors Schmidt (1974-1982) and Kohl (1982-). Similarly, support scores 
for Schmidt's and Kohl's parties (the SPD and CDU, respectively) show sy-
stematically declining trajectories while in office. 
If — as is assumed here — economic conditions drive support for both 
chancellors and their parties, a single equation approach is problematic because 
of the interrelationship of chancellor and party support. In this case, reciprocal 
effects create problems of estimation because the simultaneity of effects cannot 
be accommodated by a single equation approach. 
The capacity of single equation models to represent social and political phe-
nomena is limited as causality is often reciprocal, i.e., not unidirectional, or 
extends to several different levels. Therefore, researchers often resort to esti-
mating the phenomenon under investigation with the help of systems of models 
(multiequation models) that can be used to explain complex phenomena which 
involve simultaneous and unidirectional causation. These systems of models 
include, e.g., recursive hierarchical models and simultaneous equation systems; 
they all consist of more than one single equation. In simultaneous equations 
systems, causality is assumed to be reciprocal while hierarchical models are 
systems of equations where causality flows in one direction. Take the following 
examples: 
The question wording in German is as follows: 
Chancellor: »Sind Sie im großen und ganzen mit der Politik von Kanzler Name 
einverstanden oder nicht einverstanden?« 
Party: »Wenn am nächsten Sonntag Bundestagswahl wäre, welche Partei wurden Sie 
dann wählen?« 
8 
Historical Social Research, Vol. 18 — 1993 — No. 4, 4-30
Historical Social Research, Vol. 18 — 1993 — No. 4, 4-30
Historical Social Research, Vol. 18 — 1993 — No. 4, 4-30
In example 1, Y l and Y2 are thought to simultaneously cause one another. 
Example 2 is called a hierarchical system of equations because Yx is used as a 
variable to explain variation in Y 2, but Y2 is not a predictor for Y x . Hierarchical 
models can also be combined with simultaneous equation models. 
Generally speaking, simultaneous equations belong to the general class of 
»structural equation models.« Which of the models is appropriate depends on 
the researcher's understanding of the behavior to be modeled. Thus, a relatively 
great amount of a priori information about the behavior of the variables is 
generally required to develop well-specified models. In the case of chancellor 
and party support, there are also strong indications of a simultaneous relations-
hip. For illustrative purposes, consider Figure 3 which shows the simple 
Pearson correlation coefficient of chancellor approval and support for the chan-
cellor's party for all German chancellors between 1950 and 1990. The graph 
shows that there is — depending on the chancellor — a quite considerable 
positive relationship between chancellor approval and party support. The cor-
relation is strongest for Kohl (r=0.91) and Adenauer (r=0.78) and the CDU, 
respectively, and Brandt (r=0.75) and Schmidt (r=0.75) and the SPD, respec-
tively, while the correlations between Erhard's and Kiesinger's popularity and 
mass support for the CDU are more moderate (r=0.68 and r=0.34, respectively). 
In a system where chancellor approval (C) and chancellor party support (CP) 
are interrelated, i.e., used to explain one another, and both driven by economic 
conditions (E), we have a system of two simultaneous equations with two 
endogenous variables (C, CP) and one exogenous variable (E): 
where U1 and U2 are error terms. 
The classification of variables into endogenous and exogenous ones always 
depends on the specification of the models under consideration (cf. Hanushek 
and Jackson 1977). That is to say, whether a variable is categorized either way 
is determined by the question at hand and the theoretical notions on which the 
model is based. Endogenous variables are those factors that are explained by 
the regression model at hand. If endogenous variables are not simultaneously 
related, we speak of recursive causal models. However, if necessitated by the 
theory, they can be specified to explain one another as well. In that case, we 
speak of nonrecursive causal models. Exogenous variables are not explained 
by the regression model at hand; instead, they are completely determined outsi-
de of the model. The exogenous variables explain the endogenous variables, 
but they are not themselves influenced by the endogenous variables. Thus, the 
relationship between exogenous and endogenous variables is one of unidirec-
tional causality. Exogenous and endogenous variables can also appear as lag-
ged variables. A lagged variable is one whose values are determined prior to 
the current observation. Each lagged exogenous and endogenous variable is 
treated as an independent variable. 
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Exogenous variables thus affect the behavior of interest, but are not themsel-
ves affected by it. Endogenous variables may thus both a cause and a conse-
quence of the behavior under investigation. In this case, chancellor approval 
and chancellor party support are the endogenous variables, while economic 
conditions are determined outside of the system. Simultaneous equations hence 
allow the estimation of structures of interdependent relationships since each of 
the endogenous variables can have reciprocal relationships with some or all of 
the other endogenous variables. Simultaneous equations are often considered 
useful because of the mostly cross-sectional nature of social-science data that 
do not allow the assignment of a causal ordering of variables. Reciprocal ef-
12 
Historical Social Research, Vol. 18 — 1993 — No. 4, 4-30
fects will thus appear simultaneous because the data did not observe a time 
ordering. Even though time series data sometimes allow the researcher to de-
termine a time-dependent causal ordering of effects, a similar problem can 
occur in the context of time-series as well when the reciprocal effects (in 
nature) take place before a second measurement is possible; even though one 
can try to use lagged variables, the time intervals may sometimes be too long 
for a useful specification. 
However, there is a serious estimation problem: The structural equations 
cannot be estimated directly and straightforwardly in a simple single equation 
because the researcher can no longer assume that the error terms are distributed 
independently of the explanatory variables. Note that this does not mean that 
there is something wrong with the data; the reason for using simultaneous 
equation models lies in the way social and political phenomena behave and can 
be measured. A simple example demonstrate why a simple OLS estimation 
procedure is problematic in this case: 
There are two potential problems if we were to estimate these equations using 
simple OLS procedures. First, the OLS assumption that the independent variab-
les can be considered fixed in repeated samples is violated. For example, the 
endogenous variable Y2 cannot be considered fixed. According to the standard 
OLS assumptions, Y2 is assumed to be distributed independently of the distur-
bance term (U1) in equation (1). However, as the error term U2 in equation (2) 
changes, so will Y 2 , and so will Yl accordingly, as well as U1, as a result. Thus 
the endogenous variables Y1 and Y2 are correlated with the disturbance terms. 
The results are biased OLS estimates. In other words, the assumption that the 
errors are pairwise uncorrelated is violated. The error terms play a large role for 
the consistency and unbiasedness of OLS estimates; they are, however, often 
interrelated, leading to undesirable OLS estimation properties. In this example 
Y1 and Y2 cannot vary while holding Y1 or Y2 constant. Thus, more variables 
are needed than the ones that are simultaneously interrelated in order to see the 
variation in the dependent variables. Note that this is a problem inherent to the 
phenomenon under study, and not one created by the researcher. 
There are two main ways to solve the estimation problems: (a) the introduc-
tion of null restrictions, and (b) the introduction of additional variables into the 
system. However, it is important to note that both are only advisable if they are 
sensible from a substantive/theoretical point of view. First, one can assume one 
or more of the correlation coefficients to be equal to zero, i.e., that causation is 
unidirectional instead of simultaneous, or that some variables are simply not 
related. In that case, one can rearrange the equations and estimate the relations-
hips with a single equation model. The second possible solution involves in-
troducing information into the system whereby exogenous variables can be 
13 
Historical Social Research, Vol. 18 — 1993 — No. 4, 4-30
used to identify an endogenous variable that is not correlated with any other 
endogenous variable. Take the following example: 
In this case, X1 can be used to estimate the variation of Y1, and X2 can be used 
to estimate the variation of Y 2. Thus, if Y1 is chancellor approval and Y2 is 
party support, we can rewrite equations 5 and 6 as 
Equations 7 and 8 can be estimated reliably using a standard two-stage least 
squares approach. 2SLS is a single equation instrumental variable estimation 
method that can be used to estimate a system of simultaneous equations by 
estimating each equation separately. It involves regressing each endogenous 
variable used as a regressor on all exogenous variables and using the estimated 
values of these endogenous variables from this regression as the instrumental 
variable. Kennedy (1985: 134) gives a simple description of the steps involved 
in the 2SLS procedure: 
»Stage 1: regress each endogenous variable acting as a regressor in the equation 
being estimated on all the exogenous variables in t ie system of simultaneous equa-
tions and calculate the estimated values of these endogenous variables 
Stage 2: use these estimated values as instrumental variables for these endogenous 
variables or simply use these estimated values and the included exogenous variables 
as regressors in an OLS equations« 
The end result would be the estimation of two single equation models that 
include instrumental variables for both endogenous variables (in the case ana-
lyzed here: chancellor approval and chancellor party support). 
It should be pointed out that there are other procedures that can be employed 
to estimate systems of structural equations. The best known alternatives to two-
and three-stage least squares models are LISREL and Full Information Maxi-
mum Likelihood (FIML). This is not the place to discuss the advantages and 
disadvantages of each estimation procedure. Good discussions of these approa-
ches and their advantages can be found in Hanushek and Jackson (1977: 
312-324) Joreskog and Sorbom (1978, 1979), and Pedhazur (1982). For this 
analysis I relied exclusively on the standard 2SLS estimation procedure.4 
4 Suffice it to say that »the choice of procedure ultimately comes down to questions of 
availability, computational ease, and a belief in one method or another in particular 
circumstances« (Hanushek and Jackson 1977: 321). 
14 
Historical Social Research, Vol. 18 — 1993 — No. 4, 4-30
The Problem with Economic Conditions as Independent Variables 
Standard two-stage least squares regression techniques can be used to estimate 
equations 7 and 8 only if X1 and X2 are dissimilar, so they can be used to derive 
estimates for the first stage of the 2SLS process. However, in most standard 
formulations of popularity functions driven by economic conditions, X l and X2 
would not be dissimilar. Instead, we would normally use the same economic 
indicators (such as unemployment and inflation) as independent variables in 
equations 7 and 8. Hence, there would not be any variables that are exogenous 
in the sense that they are — theoretically — correlated with either C or CP but 
not with both simultaneously. This presents a serious multicollinearity problem, 
again making it impossible to estimate the variation in chancellor approval and 
party support given variable economic conditions; 2SLS would simply break 
down after the first stage (Berry 1984). The following system of simultaneous 
equations explains why: 
where C is chancellor approval, CP stands for chancellor party support, E are 
economic variables typically used in models of government support, and U1 
and U2 are the respective error terms. Applying 2SLS to estimate this system, 
we would first use the predetermined exogenous variables (E) to create an 
instrumental variable ( ) for C (or CP) by regressing C on E. In the second 
stage we would then substitute the values of the instrumental variable in 
equation 12: 
And this is where 2SLS would break down. Since is a linear combination of 
E, equation 11 would be perfectly multicoliinear. If we were to regress on E 
we would obtain an R2 of exactly 1.00 (cf. Berry 1984: 70). For the estimation 
of OLS parameters this means that there would be an infinite set of estimates 
that would be consistent with the data. As mentioned above, possible strategies 
for dealing with this problem include eliminating the variables creating the 
multicollinearity problem. For the problem at hand this would mean that we 
would have to eliminate the instrumental variable ( ). And this would be equal 
to not taking the simultaneous relationship of chancellor approval and chan-
cellor party support into account. Naturally, such a strategy would be in-
consistent with the underlying theoretical model, i.e., our understanding of how 
the world works. What can be done to remedy this situation? 
Another possible strategy is to find additional exogenous variables that are 
relatively highly correlated with one of the endogenous variables. In the case of 
models of government popularity as those considered here, this is no easy feat 
because it means that we have to find variables that we can a priori specify to 
15 
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be related to chancellor approval but not party support and vice versa. Two 
variables — both of which we can call »political« variables — are suggested 
here and the results of the analysis are presented below. They are neither the 
only possible ones, nor are they perfect. But they allow us to get a handle at the 
tricky statistical issues involved. A variable that should be positively related to 
chancellor approval but not chancellor party support is the size of the gover-
ning coalition (S) expressed in the percentage of seats the coalition has in the 
Bundestag. The greater this coalition, the greater the number of citizens whose 
parties are part of the government led by the chancellor. All else being equal, it 
is assumed that chancellor support will be higher when the government has a 
greater base of electoral support. As a check on this proposition one need only 
consider Figure 1 that plots chancellor approval, especially during the early 
years of the Federal Republic and during the Grand Coalition (1966-1969). 
Over the 1950-1990 period the pearson correlation between chancellor ap-
proval (C) and coalition size (S) is 0.48. On the other hand, a variable that 
should be negatively related to chancellor party support but not chancellor 
approval is fragmentation of the party system (N). As Pedersen (1979, 1983) 
and Bartolini and Mair (1990) have shown on the basis of aggregate electoral 
data, the degree of party system fragmentation is linked to levels of electoral 
volatility. A greater effective number of parties in a system is associated with 
greater interelection electoral swings: »... from a purely statistical point of 
view, the probability that each individual voter will vote for the same party in 
two consecutive elections will decline as the number of different available 
options increases« (Bartolini and Mair 1990: 38). Translated into the research 
on government popularity, this would mean that chancellor party support is 
influenced by the effective number of parties in a system. It is assumed that — 
everything else being equal — a greater number of effective parties leads to an 
increased probability that citizens (in the aggregate) desert the governing party 
(cf. Anderson 1993c). 
Using the formula suggested by Laakso and Taagepera (1979), I calculate the 
effective number of parties as follows:5 
5 Instead of using the more widely known Rae/Taylor index of party system fractio-
nalization, I measure party system change by changes in the effective number of 
parliamentary and electoral parties in a system. Note, however, that the formula for 
the effective number of parties carries the same information as Rae's index of party 
system fractionalization, only expressed in a different metric. The reader can obtain 
Rae's fractionalization index (F) by substituting the value for the effective number of 
parties (N) in the following formula: F = 1- (1/N). 
16 
Historical Social Research, Vol. 18 — 1993 — No. 4, 4-30
where pi is the proportion of parliamentary seats for the i-th party (Lijphart 
1984: 120). This formula contains information about the number and relative 
size of the parties in the system. It thus helps to differentiate not only between 
two- and multi-party systems, but it is also a more subtle measure than simply 
counting the number of parties that gain representation or receive votes. The 
proposed measure takes the relative strength and (parliamentary) viability of 
parties into account Or as Taagepera and Shugart have put it 
»The advantage of using the effective, rather than the actual, number of parties is that 
it establishes a nonarbitrary way to distinguish 'significant' parties from less signi-
ficant ones. The construction of the index is such that each party weights itself by 
being squared. Tiny parties contribute little to the index, while large parties contribute 
relatively more.« (Taagepera and Shugart 1993: 455).« 
The pearson correlation between chancellor party support (CP) and the effec-
tive number of parliamentary parties (N) for the period between 1950 and 1990 
is - 0.61. 
When we incorporate these variables into the system of equations, we obtain 
This system of equations can then be estimated consistently and reliably using 
the 2SLS technique. 
To test the theoretical model outlined in equations 11 and 12,1 use the public 
opinion data described above, unemployment and inflation as economic variab-
les, and coalition size and party system fragmentation variables based on elec-
toral data collected by Mackie and Rose (1974, 1982, 1991). 
Unemployment and inflation are what Nannestad and Paldam call the »Big 
Two« since they are by far the most widely used and most consistently signi-
ficant indicators of economic conditions (Nannestad and Paldam 1993: 3). Un-
employment and inflation are also those variables that constitute the chief tar-
gets of post-war economic management in Western Europe. Policymakers have 
sought to control these variables as part of Keynesian and monetarist efforts to 
steer the economy, and public discourse over successful economic performance 
has also consistently focused on unemployment and inflation for almost fifty 
years. Public opinion polls show time and again that inflation and unemploy-
ment are those economic issues of most concern to most people (Alt 1979; 
Hibbs 1987; Norpoth 1992; Anderson 1993). Given that citizens can devote 
only limited resources to gathering and digesting information about the eco-
nomy and pohtics, unemployment and inflation are those variables that are 
easiest to understand and about which information is easily and most publicly 
available through the mass media. 
Data and Measures 
17 
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Data on the economic indicators are taken from the German Statistical Of-
fice's »Wirtschaft und Statistik,« as well as the »Monthly Report of the Deut-
sche Bundesbank.« All series were adjusted for seasonal variation (Chatfield 
1989). I include the values of the economic variables with a lag of one month in 
order to measure current effects of the economy. 
It is sensible to include the absolute level of support for the chancellor's 
policies and his party during the previous month (C t - 1 , CP t - 1) in the model as 
well. This approach allows me to gauge the effects of various explanatory 
variables on altering a relatively stable base of mass support for governments 
and political parties in Western Europe. On a more technical level, this ap-
proach is reasonable since autocorrelation is a persistent problem in estimating 
time-series functions. In order to control for lagged effects (public opinion from 
one month to the next typically tracks), the level of party support during the 
previous month is included as a control measure. This formulation is also 
convenient because it means that only current values of the independent eco-
nomic variables need be included in the model instead of a more complex 
lagged model formulation. The lagged dependent variable serves to capture the 
lagged effects of the independent variables in the model which are expected to 
echo into the future. The smaller the coefficient for Ct-1 and CPt-1, the shorter 
the memory of the system (Beck 1991; King 1989; for an application see 
MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson 1992). In addition, I included five control 
variables, coded 0,1, for the different administrations, using the Adenauer ad-
ministration as a reference group. These variables — also called dummy va-
riables — account for the variations in the levels of support across chancellors-
hips. This is necessary because we are dealing with party support scores; the 
introduction of the dummies for different administrations helps avoid attribu-
ting changes in support levels to the independent variables when this is inap-
propriate. Naturally, we want to be able to account for the differentially high 
levels of support across different coalitions. The coefficients estimated for the 
dummy variables measure the difference in levels of support for different ad-
ministrations relative to the Adenauer era whose value is represented by the 
intercept. 
I estimate two models. One covers the full period between 1950 and 1990. 
The other one splits the sample by the ideological outlook of the chancellor and 
thus examines the periods of CDU and SPD chancellors separately. The full 
models are estimated in a linear and additive formulation: 
where C t is the monthly approval of the chancellor's performance, CP denotes 
public support for the governing (chancellor's) party, IC is a constant term, 
Ct-1 and CPt-1 are the previous month's levels of support, Ut-1 is the country's 
unemployment rate, It-1 is the country's rate of inflation, St stands for coalition 
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size, Nt denotes the effective number of parliamentary parties, DA is a set of 
dummy variables for the different administrations, and is an error term. 
Since popularity usually tracks, is expected to be positive. Public support 
for chancellor and party support are expected to be correlated positively; hence 
is expected to be positive. If and are negative, support for the govern-
ment declines when unemployment and/or inflation are up, and increases when 
economic conditions are good. This would correspond to the expectations of 
the reward-punishment hypothesis. If is positive, chancellor support increa-
ses with bigger coalitions (Eq.13), while chancellor party support shrinks with 
a greater number of effective parties if is negative (Eq.14). 
Estimation and Results 
The model was estimated using standard 2SLS estimation procedures. The 
results are shown below (Tables la and lb). Table 1 shows the results for the 
entire 1950-1990 period. As expected, inflation and unemployment have sig-
nificant and negative effects on public support for chancellors and their parties. 
For the entire 1950 through 1990 period, unemployment is not a significant 
predictor of chancellor approval while it is for party support. The effects of 
inflation are significant, negative for both, and similar in strength. Thus Ger-
man chancellors and their parties have lost support over the postwar period 
during times of rising inflation. Moreover, chancellors' parties have lost sig-
nificant support during times of rising unemployment and gained support when 
unemployment went down. 
The R2 is generally very high in these kinds of time-series models. The 
reason for this lies in the model specification which includes the lagged de-
pendent variables as independent variables in the model. Thus, the bulk of the 
variance explained is due to the type of model employed. The reader may 
remember that we assume the effects of the other independent variables to echo 
into the future through the lagged dependent variables. The current effects of 
the economic (and the other independent) variables are measured by the variab-
les themselves, while past effects are part of the model through the lagged 
dependent variable. 
The Durbin-Watson d statistic is calculated from the residuals of the OLS 
model; it is used to assess the extent to which first-order autocorrelation is a 
problem. A good rule of thumb is that there is less autocorrelation in the model 
the closer the value of the Durbin-Watson statistic is to 2.0. 
Chancellor approval and chancellor party support are significantly inter-
related. The positive relationship or the two variables indicates that chancellors 
rise and fall with their parties, while their parties' fortunes are also tied to their 
chancellors' success in office. However, it is important to note that the effects 
of party support on chancellor support are greater than the effects that chan-
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cellor support has on party support. What does this result mean? The results 
show that people's perceptions of the way the chancellor is handling his job is 
heavily influenced by their commitment/support for the chancellor's party whi-
le approval of the chancellor's policies has less of an effect on support for the 
chancellor's party. In Germany's party democracy (or any parliamentary sy-
stem with strong and programmatic parties), chancellors and Prime Ministers 
are agents of their parties. However, the base of the parties' support is relati-
vely stable and does not rise and fall as much with executive job performance 
as evaluations of job performance rise and fall with the parties' fortunes. 
It is possible, though, that the strength of the chancellor-party link may vary 
by type of party because of different organizational and programmatic tradi-
tions (cf. Anderson 1992). Therefore, the sample was split into periods of CDU 
and SPD leadership. Tables 2 and 3 show the results of 2SLS regressions that 
were done separately for the two periods in order to see whether (a.) the effects 
of the economy were different for these parties, and (b.) whether the relations-
hip of chancellor and party support differed for them. 
The results point to some noteworthy differences in public perceptions and 
evaluations of SPD and CDU chancellors and their parties. First, inflation is the 
economic variable that is significantly and negatively related to chancellor and 
chancellor party support during times of CDU government, while unemploy-
ment is the economic variable that drives support for the SPD and SPD chan-
cellors , respectively). Put differently: The CDU and its 
chancellors lost support with rising inflation rates, while the SPD and its chan-
cellors lost support with rises in unemployment. It is interesting to note that 
CDU chancellors gained support during times of rising unemployment. This 
finding is contrary to the traditional reward-punishment thesis, but in line with 
the stability argument made by Paldam and Schneider (1980) who conjecture 
that some parties may actually gain support during hard economic times be-
cause of their perceived competence to deal with economic crises. In the case 
of postwar Germany, the CDU as the party of the economic miracle has had an 
undeniable competence to deal with economic problems; as a result, citizens 
have rallied around CDU chancellors during hard times. 
Coalition size is a more significant predictor of mass support for CDU chan-
cellors than the SPD chancellors Brandt and Schmidt, while changes in the 
party system are more significant predictors of SPD than CDU support Ho-
wever, both are very significantly and negatively affected by a greater effective 
number of parliamentary parties in the system. 
Maybe more important is the finding that one pattern of the chancellor and 
chancellor party support found for the entire 1950-1990 period is not replicated 
for both SPD and CDU administrations: While the impact of the chancellor's 
party's support on chancellor approval is approximately equal for periods of 
CDU and SPD government and 0.31 respectively), the coefficient for 
the effects of chancellor approval on chancellor party support is highly signi-
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ficant for the CDU but virtually zero in the case of the SPD. This means that 
support for the CDU is systematically related to support for the CDU chancel-
lor, while the opposite does not hold for the SPD. Put differently: Support for 
the CDU rises and falls with support for its chancellor, while support for the 
SPD is relatively independent of its chancellor's popularity. In the case of the 
SPD, approval for the chancellor is therefore a less significant predictor and 
factor in terms of support for the party. This finding is in line with the folklore 
that the CDU is a »Chancellor Election Club« (Kanzlerwahlverein), whereas 
the SPD is a more hierarchically organized, programmatically oriented party 
whose fortunes are less closely tied to the job performance of its chancellor(s) 
(cf. Anderson 1992; see also Marsh and Harrison 1993). 
Overall, these results indicate that it is important to consider the relationship 
between chancellor approval and chancellor party support. However, this re-
lationship is not automatic. It depends on the type of party under consideration. 
There is a significant impact of party support on chancellor support for both 
parties. But chancellor approval is a significant predictor of chancellor party 
support only in the case of the CDU. 
Conclusion 
The relationship of executive approval and governing party support is essential 
for understanding the dynamics of government popularity. However, this re-
lationship has rarely been investigated systematically in the context of econo-
mically driven popularity functions. The reason for this may — at least partial-
ly — lie in the methodological problems researchers encounter. Since the re-
lationship between executive popularity and mass support for the executive's 
party is simultaneous while both are driven by the same economic conditions, it 
is difficult to disentangle the relationship with ordinary least squares or other 
single equation approaches. Utilizing data on German chancellors and their 
parties, this paper has suggested one way out of the modeling dilemma by 
employing a two-stage least squares approach. I find that — while economic 
conditions are important for explaining the dynamics of mass support — there 
is a significant relationship between the support for the executive and the sup-
port for his/her party. However, as the German case indicates, the relationship 
is not equally strong in both directions for all parties. In fact, approval for the 
chancellor's policies is less important for chancellor party support than vice 
versa, in particular in the case of the SPD. Conversely, support for the CDU is 
much more driven by public support for a CDU chancellor than in the SPD's 
case. Support for the SPD drives mass support for SPD chancellors but is not 
heavily dependent on the public's approval of an SPD chancellor's record. 
Overall, the results presented here suggest that it is necessary to utilize a more 
complete array of political (as well as economic) variables if we seek to con-
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struct more fully specified models of mass support for governments in western 
democracies. 
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